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Abstracts 
Purpose- Entrepreneurs propose; institutions facilitate; markets decide; knowledge grows and 
development occurs.  This process of development with growth of knowledge through institutions and 
entrepreneurship may be of interest for many. But the topic „Institutions and Entrepreneurship‟ 
overlaps several areas of research, and therefore works are fragmented.  
 
Design/methodology/approach- The paper pulls together these various strains of research. Various 
theoretical and empirical studies have been discussed related to this but are of course not exhaustive. 
 
Findings- The contributions of both the classical and modern literatures are equally important in 
understanding the two related and valuable concepts of Institutions and Entrepreneurship. Identifying 
the variables through which the mechanism of Institutions affect the quantity and quality of 
Entrepreneurship of a region are crucial. The paper advocates the study of Institutions in a cluster; in 
a general framework rather than in isolation.  The efficiency of an institutional set up hinges on the 
various complementary elements and therefore there is a need of coherence among all related 
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Introduction 
          Many eminent scholars have considered entrepreneurship crucial for 
economic prosperity of a region. It is considered an important mechanism 
for economic development through employment, innovation and welfare. 
Entrepreneurship is so important for economic performances that it has 
sometimes been conceptualised as fourth factor of production besides land, 
labour and capital. It is considered as the „missing link‟ between investment 
in knowledge and economic growth. Moreover policymakers want to en-
courage entrepreneurship in their local economies because of its linkage to 
stronger subsequent job growth for regions. Studies on entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneurship have extensively discussed on personal traits of recog-
nised entrepreneurs based on the ideas of (Cantillion, Schumpeter, Mises, 
Kirzner, Knight)  and have highlighted the individual attributes and capa-
bilities centred on the individual units. However scholars have also paid 
attention to the environment that defines and creates opportunities for them. 
This environmental view in which the concept and practice of entrepreneur-
ship is enshrined with virtuous status has been considered as a potent act of 
institutionalisation by Hwang and Powell (2008). The institutional environ-
ment view of entrepreneurship argues that while entrepreneurship is impor-
tant in all economies, its supply and performances depend on the external 
environment (Institutions). Various studies (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson, 
2013; Boettke & Coyne, 2009; Acs & Szerb, 2010; Estrin and Mickiewicz, 
2010; Dinh, Mavridis and Nguyen, 2010; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Sautet, 2005; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004, Harper, 2003; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001 and many others) have advocated the importance of Insti-
tutions in the field of entrepreneurship. The structure and level of institu-
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tional set up may have a major influence on quality as well as on the quan-
tity of entrepreneurship. An adequate institutional framework may enable a 
region to be capable enough of catching any innovation anywhere rather 
than engaging in hefty competition.  Therefore the relationship of institu-
tions and entrepreneurship is important to understand why the relative con-
tribution of entrepreneurship varies significantly across the regions.  
Entrepreneurs propose; institutions facilitate; markets decide; knowledge 
grows and development occurs.  This process of development with growth of 
knowledge through institutions and entrepreneurship may be of interest for 
many policymakers. There may be a room for them to build up a favourable 
environment which can attract the innovators and knowledge bearers. The 
variations in entrepreneurship level between regions can be better under-
stood through the lens of institutions. But from an empirical perspective and 
policy view point it is also necessary to find out which Institutional vari-
ables or regional traits encourage local entrepreneurship of a region? Be-
cause the topic „Institutions and Entrepreneurship‟ overlaps several areas 
of research, works are fragmented. The purpose of the paper is to pull to-
gether these various strains of research to illustrate the fundamental and 
current state of knowledge on Institutions and entrepreneurship. For the 
purpose of the paper various theoretical and empirical studies have been 
discussed, but are of course not exhaustive. It hopes to contribute in under-
standing these two related and valuable concepts.  This section of introduc-
tion is followed by section 2 in which the definitions, concepts and impor-
tance of entrepreneurship are discussed. Section 3 discuses the concepts 
and significance of Institutions in general and specific to entrepreneurship. 
In section 4 various empirical literatures related to institutional variables 
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and determinants are illustrated. Section 5 concludes with policy implica-
tions. 
 
Entrepreneurship: Definitions and Importance 
Definitions 
The concept of entrepreneurship would be always there in the society but 
the term “entrepreneur” first appears in the literature in 1253, when it was 
used in different forms (e.g. „empreneur‟) and after that it was commonly 
used in 1500 and 1600s (Filion, 2011). Richard Cantillion in his famous 
work „Essay on the Nature of Commerce in General (1755)‟ described the 
entrepreneur as a person who purchases a raw material at a known price 
and sell it at unknown price (as cited in Filion, 2011). From the definition of 
Cantillion we can extract at least two dimensions of entrepreneurship, first 
the investment by purchasing raw material and second the risk of selling at 
unknown price. After Cantillion, Jean-Baptiste Say regarded entrepreneurs 
as being people who could do new things, people who could do more with 
less, and people who would obtain more by doing something in a new or 
different way   (as cited in Filion, 2011). The pioneer of the entrepreneur-
ship, Schumpeter coined the word „unternehmergeist‟ German for entrepre-
neurial spirit acknowledging “fiery souls” or “wild spirits”. He believed 
that entrepreneurs are the individuals who make ideas workable in the 
economy and can challenge the established ways of doing things. Schum-
peter in his classic treatise „Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen 
(Theory of economic development, 1911)‟ mentioned the concept of “crea-
tive destruction” related to the contribution of innovation by entrepreneurs 
(Audretsch, Keilbach and Lehman, 2006; Ripsas, 1998; Filion, 2011). He 
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described five types of innovative activities by entrepreneurs as the entre-
preneurial function involving the (a) New Products, (b) New Methods of 
Production, (c) New Sources of Supply, (d) New Markets and (e) New Ways 
to Organise (Hwang and Powell, 2008). For Schumpeter an entrepreneur 
need not to be an inventor, he can innovate even within the available condi-
tions by recombination. He argues that the inventor produces ideas, but the 
entrepreneur “gets thing done” (as cited in Godin, Clemens and Veldhuis, 
2008). Similar to Schumpeter‟s view Kirzner, a representative of Austrian 
tradition described the entrepreneurs as „alert discoverer‟ or discoverer of 
new opportunities; who unlike all other participants are not mere price tak-
ers but are capable of price and quality making. “The entrepreneur who 
dominated my 1973 work did not need to be creative at all; He simply had 
to be alert to price differentials which others had not yet noticed ” (Kirzner, 
2008). According to Kirzner an entrepreneur is an arbitrageur; a middle-
man who recombines productive activities to produce more valuable outputs 
and/or use cheaper inputs in order to squeeze out those arbitrage-profit op-
portunities which he has noticed as an alert discoverer (Kirzner, 2008; Rip-
sas, 1998; Fogel, Hawk, Morck and Yeung, 2008). Thus profit winning be-
haviour of entrepreneurs is a creativity that embraces alertness too.   Fol-
lowing Mises and Hayek, Kirzner (1997) has also highlighted the decision 
making capacity of entrepreneurs and their perception of profit opportuni-
ties as market-imbalance equilibrating function. The concept of uncertainty 
and the entrepreneur as the risk bearer became the focus of Knight and 
Chicago school in the field of entrepreneurship. Even Schumpeter notes that 
the capitalist function and entrepreneurial function often overlap in reality, 
and thus entrepreneurs often become bearer of risk in their role as capital-
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ist. Adaptive and speculative functions of entrepreneurs are highlighted by 
Von Mises, Schumpeter, Knight and many others (Godin, Clemens and 
Veldhuis, 2008; Kirzner, 2008).  Casson (1982) made an addition by stress-
ing the role of entrepreneur as co-ordinator who tries to integrate entrepre-
neurial decisions making (as cited in Ripsas, 1998). Leibenstein (1968) de-
fines entrepreneur as an individual or group of individuals with four major 
characteristics: he connects different markets, he is capable of making up 
for market deficiencies (gap-filling), he is an “input completer” and he cre-
ates or expands time binding, input-transforming entities (i.e. firms). Com-
bining many of these definitions Filion (2011) expresses: an entrepreneur is 
an actor who innovates by recognising opportunities; he or she makes mod-
erately risky decisions that leads into actions requiring the efficient use of 
resources and contributing an added value. While there are many defini-
tions available for entrepreneurs, Baumol‟s notion regarding entrepreneur-
ship are that the subject is conceptually elusive and term has not always had 
clear theoretical content (Leff, 1979). Therefore defining entrepreneurship 
is difficult and lack agreements among economists as it has various dimen-
sions. That would be a probable reason that the term entrepreneur and en-
trepreneurship is used interchangeably in the literatures and one may find 
many definitions of entrepreneurship depending on the context of studies of 
various authors. While a generally accepted definition is lacking there is 
agreement that the concept comprises numerous dimensions like unique 
traits, risk taking, opportunity recognition, coordination, recombination, 
motivation and exploitation and innovation. All the aspects whether Schum-
peterian creativity, Kirzner‟s alertness and arbitrage contexts or Knight‟s 
uncertainty-bearing are part of entrepreneurial activity.  Lazear (2005) 
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makes a statement in relevance that entrepreneurs perform many functions 
and therefore must be a generalist “Jacks of all Trades” who need not excel 
in any one skill. He describes entrepreneurship as the process of assembling 
necessary factors of production consisting of human, physical and informa-
tion resources and doing so in an efficient manner. All the attributes of en-
trepreneurs‟ and the activities pursued by him may be considered as entre-
preneurship. Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs cannot be dissociated 
from each other. 
Importance of Entrepreneurship 
Traditionally economists stress on increasing productivity to overcome the 
problem of diminishing returns. Initially it was supposed to be achieved 
through accumulation of physical capital and division of labour by speciali-
sation. Later new growth theorists like Romer and Lucas have recognised 
knowledge as an essential driver of economic growth. The mandate for en-
trepreneurship policy has emerged from the failure of the traditional policy, 
corresponding to the Solow model or those based on instruments promoting 
investment in physical capital and from the failure of the new policy instru-
ments, corresponding to the Romer model or those promoting investment 
into knowledge capital through education and research and development 
(Audretsch et al., 2006). For the advocates of entrepreneurship the source 
of productivity enhancement lies in the increase of knowledge which entre-
preneurial activity generates and exploits the same for profit and growth. 
Though there was direct production of knowledge or important inventions 
made in some economies, there was little effort to imitating and implement-
ing the ideas (Schmitz, 1989). For example early china and Sweden are be-
lieved to have such experiences. Sweden and many other European coun-
Kumar, G. 2014. Understanding Institutions in the Context of Entrepreneurship 
52 
tries with high level of investment in research and development and human 
capital had stagnant growth rates and were sluggish throughout the 1990s 
and into the new century (Audretsch et al., 2006). This empirical experience 
of failure of investment in new knowledge has recognised entrepreneurship 
and/or small firms essential for economic growth. Entrepreneurship takes 
on adequate importance in today‟s knowledge economy because it serves as 
a key mechanism by which ideas or knowledge are transformed into the ac-
tion contributing to economic growth and employment.  Audretsch et al. 
(2006) have recognised it as the „missing link‟ between investment in new 
knowledge and economic growth. Moreover they advocate that rather than 
imposing efficiency burden on the economy as seemingly was the case in the 
Solow economy, entrepreneurship serves as an engine of growth by provid-
ing a vital conduit for the spill over and commercialisation of  knowledge 
and new ideas. Even the Schumpeter‟s metaphor of “creative destruction” 
is embedded in the basic process of entrepreneurship fuelling economic 
growth. In case of developing countries Leff (1979) considers entrepreneur-
ship essential for investment, innovation and structural changes if economic 
development is to be achieved in the underdeveloped countries. He identifies 
a key function of entrepreneurship in developing countries is to mobilise 
factors such as capital and specialised labour which are imperfectly mar-
keted. Therefore entrepreneurship also acts as a channel for inputs supply 
and sale of outputs in the process of economic development. It has come to 
be well recognised now that an economy‟s prosperity depends greatly on a 
dynamic entrepreneurship sector and the difference of entrepreneurial op-
portunities and activities is one important factor determining the varying 
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levels of wealth and prosperity across regions and countries (GEM, 2011; 
Boettke & Coyne, 2009). 
Institutions: Meaning and Significance 
Meaning of Institutions 
 „Agent-Structure‟ mechanism would be the basis of the concept of Institu-
tions and being a conceptual term there may be various conceptions and 
definitions of it. The notion of Institutions can be traced back to the Adam 
Smith (1776) who put forth the famous notion of the “invisible hand” which 
operates within the market context (as cited in Boettke and Coyne, 2009). 
Formal and informal Institutions would be the Smith‟s „invisible hand‟ 
which takes care of the market as an Institution coordinated by the pricing 
system. But prior to 1918, Institutional Economics had not emerged as an 
identifiable school of economic thought. Yet by that time, Thorstein Veblen‟s 
works had achieved an immense popularity (Hodgson, 2004). Thorstein 
Bunde Veblen (1857-1929) is believed to be a primary mentor, along with 
John R. Commons of the Institutional Economics movement. He wanted 
economists to grasp the effects of social and cultural factors on economic 
outcomes. Veblen famously described Institutions as involving „settled ha-
bits of thought, common to the generality of men and being an outgrowth of 
habit‟ (Hodgson, 1998; 2004). Commons identified them as collective action 
in control of individual action (Mitchell, 1935). The other promoters of In-
stitutionalism were Hamilton, Clark and Mitchell. Hamilton (1932) saw an 
Institution as “a way of thought or action of some prevalence and perma-
nence which is embedded in the habits of a group or customs of the people” 
(as cited in Hodgson, 2004). While Veblen and Hamilton stress on the set-
tled habits and thoughts, Mitchell developed the Institutional economics of 
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aggregates and hinted the idea of „Downward Causation‟ from Institutions 
to individuals. The views of these economists with core ideas of habits, way 
of thought, downward causation, and Institutions and their evolution are 
referred as „Old Institutional Economics (OIE)‟ in the literature of econom-
ics. OIE had some objections with the mainstream economics and had an 
alternative view.  For Hamilton the most important omission of neoclassical 
economics theory was its neglect of “the influence exercised over conduct 
by the scheme of institutions under which one lives” (as cited in Hodgson, 
2004).  Similarly Mitchell argued that economics had been misled into an 
abstract description of rational economic man. The real problem of eco-
nomics was to understand the Institutional and cultural context in which 
individual capabilities were moulded.  Clark also undermined the proposi-
tion of global rationality by showing that, because of imperfect information 
even if the rational calculator had reached an optimum „no claim of exact-
ness‟ could be made (Hodgson, 2004). But the idea of old Institutionalism in 
particular was partially disabled by a combined result of the profound shifts 
in social sciences in 1910-1940 period and of the rise of a mathematical 
style of neoclassical economics in the depression stricken 1930s (Hodgson, 
1998). During this period, Coase and his works are also sometimes believed 
to belong to the tradition of institutionalism. It is commonly said and it may 
be true that the New Institutional Economics start with Coase‟s article “The 
Nature of the firm (1937)” with its explicit introduction of transaction costs 
into economic analysis (Coase, 1998). [North]
1
 points that it was Ronald 
Coase who made the connections between the institutions, transaction costs 
                                                     
1
 An Essay by Douglass C. North, Washington University, St. Louis available at: 
http://128.118.178.162/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf (accessed March 15, 2014). 
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and neoclassical theory: a connection which even now has not been com-
pletely understood by the economic profession. After some decades from the 
mid-1970s, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) began to attract the at-
tention within the discipline of economics. In 1975, Oliver E. Williamson 
published his ground breaking work, „Markets and Hierarchies‟ and called 
his approach New Institutional Economics (Groenwegen, Spithover and 
Berg, 2010). Williamson did not want to be associated with OIE and con-
siders his NIE not to be an alternative but complementary to neoclassical 
economics. According to North the NIE builds on, modifies and extends neo-
classical theory to permit it to come to grips and deal with an entire range 
of issues heretofore beyond its ken [North]. Basically NIE is an attempt to 
incorporate institutions into economics. The ideas of NIE have received 
widespread recognition when Douglass North has been awarded Nobel 
Prize for his work on Institutions and Institutional change. Perhaps he has 
provided the most commonly agreed definition: “Institutions are the hu-
manly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social in-
teraction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, cus-
toms, traditions and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)” (North, 1991). After some modifications North redefined 
Institutions in the following terms: „Institutions are the constraints that hu-
man beings impose on human interaction‟ (as cited in Hodgson, 2004). He 
wrote most often of formal and informal constraints rather than formal or 
informal rules to overcome the misconception that all Institutions are de-
creed in laws or rules. The definition of North suggests three fundamental 
elements of Institutions: the first one is the formal or written constraints-
political systems, laws, governing contracts, the imposition of taxes, tariffs 
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and regulations etc. These constraints can be created by governments as 
well as within firms and organizations. The second one is the informal con-
straints, written in the minds and hearts of people-culture, norms of behav-
iour, customs, values and religions etc. The last one is the enforcement 
mechanism. Institutions have no meaning without practice or enforcement. 
Enforcement means not only enforcement of agreements but also protection 
of lives, goods and services (North, 1991). The recognition of social and 
exogenous influences on individual cognition places North very close to or 
even within the old institutionalism‟s tradition view of downward causation. 
The basic idea of Institutions (formal and/or informal) is the aggregate 
structure having influence on the individual units which develops a particu-
lar behaviour on them. 
Figure 1. The Institutionalist Action-Information Loop 
                                                 
 
Source: Hodgson, 1998 
Individuals act according to the information and thoughts they have ac-
quired from Institutions. Institutions provide guidelines to them by con-
straining and/or enabling their activities. On the other side, the structure of 
Institutions is determined by the interactions of the individual agents. It is 
not only the given structure which influence actors, these actors preferably 
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the „innovators‟ also change the structure. Institutions are not under indi-
vidual control but the individual actions of several actors which are under 
their control lead to the evolution of Institutions (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Individual interactions and their learning through repeated experiences 
may bring changes. Learning results new habits of life and thought; thus 
brings changes in Institutions (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2011).There are 
subsequent and continuous changes of Institutions through individual 
and/or entrepreneurial feedback. Based on this whole „Agent-Structure‟ 
mechanism Clauge et al. in 1997 have mentioned five branches existing 
within the NIE: Transaction Cost Economics, The Economics of Property 
Rights, The Economics of Imperfect Information, Collective Action Theory 
and The Evolution of Rules and Norms (Boliyari & Topyan, 2007). Thus 
Institutions may be conceptualised as something exogenous in terms of in-
fluence on individuals and endogenous in the form of individual habits and 
thoughts implied and their evolution by social and economic interactions.  
 3.2 Significance of Institutions 
   Throughout history, Institutions have been devised by human beings to 
create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange (Dugger, 1995). Therefore 
Institutions are believed to bring order to an otherwise chaotic world. Be-
cause of its downward causation mechanism Institutions have always been 
considered to be a critical ingredient in understanding the wealth of na-
tions. Smith (1776): The different talents and dispositions we possess do not 
stem so much from nature but from “habits, customs and education” (as 
cited in Boettke & Coyne, 2009). Veblen had a valid and enduring insight 
regarding Institutions that an understanding of the roles of both instinct and 
habit is essential. His clearest statement was that Institutions function as 
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repositories of social knowledge and it may directly affect our choices by 
providing incentives, sanctions or constraints (Hodgson, 2004). One of the 
primary exponents of the „Primacy of Institutions‟ Rodrik (2000) makes a 
relevant statement that Institutions govern and shape the interactions of 
human beings, by helping them to form expectation of what other people 
will do. Institutional set up provide guidance regarding what actions are 
allowed or constrained, who is eligible to make decisions, what procedures 
should be followed and what payoffs are available. Institutions influence 
behaviour and are meant to provide certain safeguards before we enter into 
transactions (Groenwegen et al., 2010). They are believed to constrain and 
enable the social and economic interaction. The constraining function of 
Institutions can be explained as limiting the agents whether super-rational 
or sluggish to stay on one side of the line. Exploring it further Gode and 
Sunder suggest that structural constraints can produce similar outcomes, 
whatever the objectives or behaviour) have identified “Institutions” as pri-
mary causes of reversal of income and prosperity around the world. It is the 
emergence and diffusion of a novel set of Institutions most often extractive 
institutions which made the dramatic reversal of fortune in the countries like 
India and Indonesia, which were once prosperous to one which is now 
among one of the poor economies of the world. The institutional differences 
across the regions can be one important element to explain their economic 
performances. The concept of „costs of exchange‟ highlighted by Coase de-
pend on Institutions of a country: its legal system, its political system, its 
social system, its educational system, its culture and so on (Coase, 1998). 
The institutional approach/model‟s prediction is that two locations with 
identical geographical features, demographics, and the same level of inputs 
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(or resources) can have different outcomes because of different institutional 
structures (Hall and Sobel, 2008). In relevance to differences of Institutions 
and their influence on economic performances, Hall and Soskice (2001) in-
troduce the concept of Comparative Institutional Advantage. The concept of 
scarcity applies to natural resources in absolute sense but is relevant to In-
stitutions only in the relative sense, concerning immediate and easy avail-
ability of resources for an agent. Constraints such as trust, secure property 
rights, information, skill and education differ across the societies but can 
sometimes be enhanced; therefore they are not scarce in absolute sense 
rather in relative sense. Romer (1998) has made an important comment that 
we must not presume that devoting more resources to the basic research end 
of the process will automatically lead to economic gains. Businesses and 
places that provide good environment are just as important as conducting 
research (as cited in Cortright, 2001).  Glaeser, Scheinkman and Schleifer 
(2003) advocate Institutional reform more important than redistribution for 
economic development.    
Role of Institutions in Entrepreneurship 
The simple notion of presence or absence of entrepreneurship culture in any 
particular society and among its people has some challenging views today. 
The conception that undersupply of entrepreneurship in a society is due to 
natural lack of entrepreneurial culture among its members does not seem 
true. Human minds are amongst other things creative and enterprising, 
when provided with opportunities and incentives the basic instincts of hu-
man is to develop better ways of doing things (Potts, 2003). Sautet (2005) 
makes a relevant claim that entrepreneurial activity is never in short supply 
and is not dependent on culture or race, it can be observed in every society 
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and across all ethnicities. Ultimately what matters is the reality of the incen-
tives that people experience. Institutions are critical determinants of eco-
nomic behaviour and economic transactions in general. They can impose 
direct and indirect effects on both the supply and demand of entrepreneurs 
(Acs & Szerb, 2010). Entrepreneurship cannot take place in vacuum; it de-
pends on Institutions for performances because entrepreneurial activities 
are not self-performing, self-regulating and self-stabilising.  Institutions 
provide incentives as well as constrain the opportunities available at any 
point of time according to which entrepreneurs flourish, shrink or vanish. 
Opportunity recognition is at the heart of the entrepreneurship and there-
fore the attention should be towards the wider environment that both defines 
and create opportunities. Entrepreneurial opportunities and activities differ 
significantly across societies. These differences in entrepreneurial opportu-
nities and activities are not due purely to differences in entrepreneurial 
spirit, but instead are due to differences in Institutions (Boettke & Coyne, 
2009). The importance of Institutions implies that due to the existence and 
downward causation of Institutions, individuals behave differently in the 
presence of different Institutions. Leibenstein (1968) expresses that entre-
preneurship may be scarce in some economies but some entrepreneurial 
characteristics may in fact be in surplus supply; that is they are unused sim-
ply because of lack of motivational state and slight favourable changes in 
Institutions may turn entrepreneurial scarcity into an abundant supply. 
Therefore Mcmillan and Woodruff (2002) proposes that to explain the low 
levels of entrepreneurship, we first point to the weakness of Institutions such 
as property rights enforcement (as cited in Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2010). 
Even a strong and persistent entrepreneurial culture does not guarantee 
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successful entrepreneurship. Several favourable conditions are required 
besides incentives and property rights. Only under a certain Institutional 
context entrepreneurs have incentive to discover and enhance knowledge. 
Rodrik (2000) makes a statement that it has become clear that incentives 
would not work or generate perverse results in the absence of adequate in-
stitutions. For example if government policy of subsidies or other such pol-
icy initiatives are directed towards increasing entrepreneurship through 
maximising the number of start-ups, this may stimulate individuals to start 
businesses for the wrong reasons. There is a probability of starting busi-
nesses not because they have idea or skill that they want to try and commer-
cialise, but simply because they have an access to money for starting a 
business. These firms or businesses are likely to be unsuccessful in the lack 
of other complementary Institutions. They may even shut down once the 
scheme is removed. Dinh, Mavridis and Nguyen (2010) recognise that low 
quality institutional framework (financial constraints specifically) hampers 
the development of small firms  to grow into medium sized or large firms, 
causing the “missing middle” phenomenon in developing countries. There-
fore first Institutions should be strengthened and made favourable for the 
entrepreneurs to make them productive and successful. Hall and Sobel 
(2008) argue that policymakers should focus on improving institutions, 
rather than trying to pursue policies to increase the quantity of inputs (sub-
sidies for education, technology, venture capital etc.).  Acemoglu and John-
son (2005) advocate that as Institutions are strengthened and the incentive 
structure changes, more and more entrepreneurial activities are shifted to-
wards productive entrepreneurship.  Institutions create and shape an envi-
ronment for entrepreneurs to invest and innovate through which an econ-
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omy can flourish. Entrepreneurship within an appropriate Institutional 
framework may in effect override resource endowments and scarcity as the 
prime determinant of economic performance (Harper, 2003). Sautet (2005) 
has gone so far to state that entrepreneurship is not dependent on the re-
sources in an economy. Rather the key is the quality of institutions that per-
mit the exploitation of resources and opportunities. The presence and ab-
sence of adequate institutions dictate the performances of entrepreneurs and 
thereby the economy. The basic idea of Comparative Institutional Advan-
tage as advocated by Hall and Soskice (2001) is that the Institutional struc-
ture of a particular economy or region provides advantages in specific type 
of activities there and tends to render entrepreneurs or firms less mobile 
even when profit opportunities are available elsewhere but with Compara-
tive Institutional Disadvantage. The policymakers interested in promoting 
entrepreneurship as a means of fostering economic development may do 
best to focus their attention on the overarching Institutions rather than on 
entrepreneurship (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson, 2013).  
Empirical Perspective 
4.1 Institutions for Entrepreneurship 
From an empirical perspective and policy view point it is not sufficient to 
acknowledge that Institutions do matter. It is also necessary to find out the 
answer for a natural policy relevant question: which Institutional variables 
or regional traits encourage local entrepreneurship of a region? Lin and 
Nugent (1995) make a relevant statement that the question before policy-
makers therefore is no longer “do Institutions matter?” but “which Institu-
tions matter and how does one acquire them?” (as cited in Rodrik, 2000). 
To answer these questions Institutions need to be recognisable and in em-
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pirical format. Policymakers need to pay careful attention on many vari-
ables and determinants which are directly or indirectly related to Institu-
tions that structure the incentives for entrepreneurs and constrain their ac-
tivities. Romer argues that everything including Institutions can always be 
improved (Cortright, 2001). Since Institutions relevant to various activities 
(including entrepreneurship) are not evenly distributed, there seems a room 
for policymakers to build up a favourable local environment so that entre-
preneurship can flourish. The development of supporting Institutions may be 
crucial. It is very difficult to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for entrepreneurship development. Moreover although some Institutions are 
specific, many of them are of general nature and influence every aspects of 
the economy (Gupta, Guo, Canever, Rokyin, Kaursraw and Lin, 2014). The 
efficiency of an institutional set up hinges on the various complementary 
elements and therefore to find an isolated one to one direct and exclusive 
relationship of these variables with entrepreneurship is not reasonable and 
may have unlimited problems.  One has to study them in a cluster; in a form 
of Institutional framework. There is a need of coherence among all vari-
ables related to deliver a unified and mutually reinforcing environment. In-
formal Institutions like customs, tradition, norms and religion change very 
slowly; therefore NIE has been concerned principally on formal „rules of 
the game (Institutional environment)‟ and „play of the game (governance)‟ 
for desired outcomes (Williamson, 2000). There is no one set of Institutions 
that suit all societies, but there are advocacies for some supporting Institu-
tions by development economists. The following institutional variables have 
a positive effect on entrepreneurial activity which are conducive for entre-
preneurial development: 
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 Property Rights 
Economists have recognised secure property rights as an important Institu-
tion for economic performances. Property rights represent all the rights that 
have economic value. In the context of entrepreneurship we consider them 
of two types;  first one as the property rights to private property: the right to 
utilise and dispose of private property at one‟s disposal and the second one 
as the property rights to contracts: the right to claim an act from another 
person as specified in the contract. Private property rights Institutions pro-
tect citizens against expropriation by the government as well as by powerful 
elites and contracting Institutions enable and/or regulate private contracts 
between citizens (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Honorati & Mengistae, 
2007). Therefore secure property rights constrain the powerful authorities 
and people and enforcement of contracts constrains opportunism. They also 
enable mostly impersonal and to some extent personal economic interac-
tions among people. Agents need some guarantee that the decisions they 
take and contracts they make will be protected and they will be able to re-
ceive returns from them, if any. Systems of property rights ensure that en-
trepreneurs can recoup the rewards to which they are contracted (Aidis, 
Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2009). Otherwise the absence of secure property 
rights will discourage investment and innovation. Institutional economics 
literature has shown how important secure property rights are in encourag-
ing investment and innovation, allowing for the investor and innovator to 
reap the harvest of their efforts (Bardhan, 2005). Smith (1776): “Commerce 
and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state..................in which 
the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property” 
(as cited in Groenwegen et al., 2010). Rodrik (2000) also state that an en-
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trepreneur would not have the incentive to accumulate and innovate unless 
s/he has adequate control over the return to the assets that are thereby pro-
duced or improved.  Control is also important other than ownership as the 
people may have strong ownership but weaker control. There is also the 
possibility of control over the returns without ownership. Strong protection 
of property rights and control over the return of investment plays a pivotal 
role in the institutional environment conducive to entrepreneurial activity 
(Aidis, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2009). 
Rule of Law 
Rule of law refers to the protection of persons and property against vio-
lence, theft and other such activities. Therefore it is to some extent related to 
the sense of protection of property rights. Usually rule of law is a percep-
tual concept and is enforced by governments through police, judiciary and 
other regulatory Institutions. Rule of law is scored higher when there is a 
strong court system and sound political Institutions while lower scores indi-
cate a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997). In the absence of rule of law, public authorities and powerful 
individuals are prone to engage in a flood of arbitrary and inconsistent un-
productive activities that can dampen entrepreneurship and economic 
growth. Harper (2003) advocates that rule of law allow entrepreneurs to 
make the best use of their own unique competencies and localised knowl-
edge. It stipulates that law must be enforced; violations if any should be ad-
judicated by an independent judiciary. Judiciary and police have an impor-
tant role in creating faith in law. The fundamental underpinnings of Institu-
tions are an effective legal structure and court system to enforce contracts 
and laws (North, 1991). Inefficient judicial process may cause more viola-
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tions of property rights, breach of trust and violence. Fogel et al. (2008) 
argue that weak property rights and lack of faith in the courts discourages 
investment even though opportunities exist. Weak judiciary imposes signifi-
cant costs on doing business more specifically in developing countries 
(Rodrik, 2008). Individual perception about the fairness and justice is quite 
essential as it obviously affect the decisions regarding investment. Rule of 
law along with secure property rights improve the transactional trust and 
make coordination failure less likely which is important for entrepreneur-
ship development. 
Besides the Institutions of property rights and rule of law there are some 
context specific variables of entrepreneurship, of course not in strict sense. 
These variables may be termed as Institutional prerequisites or determi-
nants of Institutions and are from supply side conditions which promote or 
constrain the generation and application of entrepreneurship. 
Market Size 
Acs and Szerb (2010) have explained the size of market as a combined 
measure of domestic market size in terms of GDP or income and the urbani-
sation of a region. Both of them are used jointly to measure the agglomera-
tion effect on the opportunity perception of entrepreneurs. The interaction of 
higher per capita income and urbanisation create new market niches and 
provide more opportunities for entrepreneurs. Development level which is 
sometimes measured in the terms of per capita GDP/Income operates on 
Institutional quality through both supply and demand. It provides resources 
for better Institution formation and also demands a better Institutional qual-
ity. Positive relationship between growth and Institutions has been advo-
cated in many studies (Rodrik, 2004; Alonso & Garcimartin, 2009; Acs & 
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Szerb, 2010). On the other hand low purchasing power has been identified 
as formal Institutional barrier for entrepreneurship development by Aidis 
(2005). In the Mills and Schumann model high level of output can be inter-
preted as one source of entrepreneurial opportunities (Audretsch et al. 
2006). Thus a high level of output implies a large market size. But even a 
high level of output may not create limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs 
in the economy. Diversity of activities is also essential. Urbanisation fills 
this gap. „Urbanisation economies‟ imply a much more diversified demand 
structure  and may offer advantages of flexibility secured by a diversity of 
activities which tends to prevent a process of negative lock in (Lambooy & 
Boschna, 1998; Lingthelm, 2010). More dynamic and diversified the market 
is, the greater the perception of opportunities (Sune and Panisello, 2013). 
Urban areas usually attract (small) businesses because of existing infra-
structure consisting of other businesses, financial advisory and educational 
institutions (Verheul, Wennekers, Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). Moreover 
urbanisation may also decline the willingness of people to conform to the 
old practices of living. Therefore agglomeration of higher output level and 
urbanisation contributes to the development of higher quality of Institu-
tional environment for entrepreneurship by creating more opportunities and 
a larger market size.  Smith expressed that how the division of labour is lim-
ited by the size of the market (Hall and Sobel, 2008). GEM (2011) has rec-
ognised the efficiency enhancing capability of market-size in entrepreneur-
ship.  
Size of Government 
Larger size of the government activities limits the opportunities for private 
entrepreneurs. In general, a large state sector militates against entrepre-
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neurial activity, both via state revenues and expenditures (Aidis, Estrin and 
Mickiewicz, 2009). Studies (Bruce and Deskins, 2010; Aidis, Estrin and 
Mickiewicz, 2009) have found negative effect from the size of the state sec-
tor on entrepreneurial activity which means states or regions with larger 
size of governments, as measured by state expenditures per capita or other 
means, tend to have lower entrepreneurial shares. Moreover Fogel et al. 
(2008) argue that generally direct government activism favours large estab-
lished corporations which adversely affect entrepreneurship. Economists 
advocate economic freedom conducive for entrepreneurship and smaller 
government size is a component of that. Harper (2003) explains economic 
freedom as freedom of entrepreneurial choice, freedom to enter and com-
pete in markets, freedom of exchange and freedom of contract. High level of 
government size and activities curtail these economic freedoms through 
taxes, licenses and other means. Though there is a consensus regarding 
negative effects of larger government size on entrepreneurship, the magni-
tudes, signs and statistical significance of the taxes have not been conclu-
sive. Additionally various countries treat income from different sources dif-
ferently, therefore any generalisation is not possible. Aidis (2005) recog-
nised high level of taxes as a formal barrier to entrepreneurship. Empirical 
Studies like (Bruce and Deskins, 2010; Hansson, 2012; Calvez and Bruce, 
2013 generally indicate that taxes have statistically significant but very 
small and scattered effects on entrepreneurship. It can‟t be argued that tax 
should be lowered but one can definitely argue that government size should 
be kept small for development for entrepreneurship. 
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Income Distribution 
Income distribution is one of the variables considered as the determinants of 
Institutions. Inequality crucially shapes Institutional subversion and is det-
rimental to the security of property rights as it enables the rich to subvert 
the political, legal and regulatory Institutions of the society for their own 
benefit (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Schleifer, 2003).While equal distribution 
of income provides equal opportunities to all so that everyone has the incen-
tive to better themselves and to participate productively in the society; ine-
quality leads to some individuals to take decisions that is against their in-
terests in the lack of choices. To some extent, it is the persistence of wealth 
inequality not the entrepreneurial efficiency which determines the activities 
chosen by individuals. A high level of inherited wealth inequality is the pri-
mary determinant of occupation because wealthy agents can invest in capi-
tal and profitably exploit cheap labour (Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000).  More-
over inequality facilitates that Institutions remain captured by groups of 
powerful whose actions are oriented to particular interests rather than 
common good. It favours corruption and rent seeking behaviour rather than 
entrepreneurship (Alonso & Garcimartin, 2009). Strong inequality also 
causes divergent interests leading to conflicts, socio-political instability and 
insecurity. Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that a society in which a very small 
fraction of the population for example, a class of landlords, holds all wealth 
and political power may not be the ideal environment for investment , even 
if the property rights of this elite class are secure. On the other hand GEM 
(2011) recognises that societies are more likely to realise the full potential 
of their entrepreneurial human resources when it is available to all. Equal-
ity leads to social and economic inclusivity. Access to wealth is positively 
Kumar, G. 2014. Understanding Institutions in the Context of Entrepreneurship 
70 
and significantly correlated with the probability of becoming self-employed; 
as the equality improves fewer agents are wealth constrained (Ellis and 
Bernhardt, 2000; Hansson, 2012). The greater the degree of social and 
economic inclusion the larger the potential pool of participants available to 
contribute to the creative process essential for innovation (Wolfe & Bram-
well, 2008).  
Education  
Human capital is an important aspect of the supply of entrepreneurship. 
Education lets latent entrepreneurs realise that opportunities exist. It may 
be difficult to train people to discover opportunities; but it is possible to 
make them capable to assess such opportunities once perceived through 
education (Leibenstein, 1968). Therefore education is not a robust determi-
nant of self-employment but it is a strong determinant of entrepreneurship 
(Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014). Fogel et al. (2008) argue that higher 
general level of education makes a greater fraction of population available 
as entrepreneurs. Moreover a more educated population demands more 
transparent and dynamic Institutions and permits to build those (Alonso & 
Garcimartin, 2009). Education has been recognised for enhancing effi-
ciency of entrepreneurship development by GEM (2011). On the other hand 
low education level may constrain the participation in entrepreneurship and 
is considered as environmental barrier of entrepreneurship by Aidis (2005). 
An important risk (potential) investors and business owners face in develop-
ing countries is insufficient or inadequate availability of educated and 
skilled personnel which limits entrepreneurship in these countries. The posi-
tive relationship between education and entrepreneurial trial and success is 
supported by the studies of (Nikolova & Simroth, 2013; Aidis, Estrin and 
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Mickiewicz, 2009; Acs & Szerb, 2010 and Gupta et al., 2014). Hay and 
Camp (1999) conclude that the larger a country‟s investment in education 
at the tertiary level, the higher the rate of new firm formation (as cited in 
Verheul et al., 2000). Bruce and Deskins (2010) find that U.S. states in 
which a larger share of the adult population holds a college degree tend to 
have higher rates of tax-based entrepreneurship. 
 Availability of Information  
Availability of information is a vital component in the process of innovation. 
Access of people to relevant information through various communication 
means and media sources determines the rate of entrepreneurship. For ex-
ample Harper (2003) illustrates that the informal communication of the 
price differences of the same good at different places create entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Lack of information may constrain the entrepreneurial activi-
ties even though opportunities exist. On the other hand larger information 
access reduces the transaction cost which is an important barrier in entre-
preneurship development. There are endless opportunities for people to im-
prove their position by gaining more or better information (Godin, Clemens 
and Veldhuis, 2008). Additionally greater transparency through media lead 
to more accountable Institutions and lead to a more active and demanding 
citizenry and thereby better Institutions. Mass media by contributing to so-
cial transparency raises people‟s willingness to challenge established elite 
(Fogel et al., 2008; Subramanian, 2007). 
Credit or Finance 
It is unreasonable to imagine any development of entrepreneurship without 
adequate amount of credit or finance. Schumpeter pointed out that the im-
portance of credit cannot be dissociated from entrepreneurial action (as 
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cited in Croitoru, 2012). While credit constraint may limit entrepreneurship, 
its availability facilitates that. Improving access to finance boost the entry 
rate and growth of firms, on the other hand lack of credit desists entrepre-
neurs from starting a business even though there are availability of oppor-
tunities. Entrepreneurship is less likely to take the form of start-ups when 
capital market imperfections make it difficult for them to secure financing. 
Aidis (2005) recognised lack of funds for business investment as environ-
mental barriers to entrepreneurs. Studies have considered access to finance 
or credit as one important element of Institutional quality for entrepreneur-
ship and lack of it as a key impediment to entrepreneurial development 
(GEM, 2011; Estrin & Mickiewz, 2010; Dinh, Mavridis and Nguyen, 2010; 
Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000). 
Political and Policy Stability 
The political instability creates uncertainty among the investors and there-
fore discourages them to take risks in the expectation that policies will not 
remain stable. Uncertainty provokes firm to conduct routinized behaviour; 
which limits to a large extent available options (Lambooy & Boschna, 
1998). Only under a certain and stable Institutional framework do entrepre-
neurs have incentive to invest and innovate. It is believed that a politically 
stable country or region will have lower levels of risk and transac-
tion/contracting cost and higher levels of predictability and accountability.  
Frequent changes in government may make leaders less likely to accept the 
obligations of previous government. Moreover political instability creates 
fear of replacement among the leaders which make them more likely to ex-
propriate and be corrupt rather than to develop better Institutions (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995). Dutta, Sobel and Roy (2013) find that political stability 
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within a country does indeed lead to an increased rate of entrepreneurship 
and wealth creation. 
Openness 
Trade openness expands markets, constrains local monopolists; and intro-
duces new ideas. It promotes competitive environment and creates demand-
ing and dynamic environment. Openness in the form of international trade 
and investment stimulates competition and entrepreneurship. It can facili-
tate learning processes and good practices imitation from other countries 
experience. The studies of (Alonso and Garcimartin, 2009; Fogel et.al, 
2008; Acs and Szerb, 2010) advocate for openness of an economy for better 
institutional quality and entrepreneurial development. On the other hand 
the study of Schloman, Stel and Thurik (2014) in case of OECD economies 
suggests that economic openness plays a role in creating entrepreneurial 
opportunities but related to a country‟s cyclical performances. When 
economies are booming, the share of self-employment may be increasing in 
the medium or long run but it may be opposite in case of recession or slow 
growth. Therefore it is difficult to make general conclusive statement.  
Other than the above mentioned objective indicators and/or determinants of 
Institutions, Social Institutions are equally important. Social Institutions are 
concepts such as norms, beliefs, trust and civic cooperation, which coincide 
largely with informal constraints of Institutions according to classification. 
Social Institutions are referred in many forms as social capital or social 
networks. The role of social Institutions should be seen as complementary in 
understanding the role of other Institutions (Krasniqi and Kume, 2013). 
Many of these informal Institutions (customs, traditions, norms, religion) 
change very slowly-on the order of centuries because of their embedded-
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ness. These Institutions may be significant in determination of entrepreneur-
ship but are often non-calculative (Williamson, 2000). For example authori-
tarian and hierarchical societies fail to honour self made success and pro-
vide social status to innovators, which is surely a constraint to entrepre-
neurship. Similarly lack of trust and cooperation may limit economic trans-
actions and thereby innovation. 
Conclusion 
The notion that Institutions affect the level of entrepreneurship can hardly 
be questioned today. Institutions of property rights, rule of law and many 
others may result entrepreneurial quality differences across the states, re-
gions or countries. Institutional prerequisites or determinants such as mar-
ket size, income distribution, education, information availability and credit 
accessibility are important context specific variables of entrepreneurship. 
The availability and quality of these variables determines the opportunities 
available to entrepreneurship.  The acknowledgement of weakness of a state 
on a particular indicator may provide a room for development by improving 
these constraints rather than simple policy making. After all there is not a 
perfect but only a partial substitution that exists among the elements of the 
system. Policies and incentives may somehow lead to sharp outbreak for 
some time;  but it may lose the pace afterwards in the lack of complemen-
tary Institutions. On the other side with a strong and balanced Institutional 
framework a region can develop productive entrepreneurship with a subse-
quent job growth in the region. It becomes capable to even catch up and ac-
commodate innovations outside the region. Thus Institutions should be 
strengthened to have a strong entrepreneurial growth which is one of the 
prime components of development. 
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